Working Papers

Public Policy and Private-Sector Prosocial Efforts: The Case of Greenhouse Gas Emissions          Paper

Runner-Up, 5th Annual Sustainable Finance in Fixed Income Research Competition

Presentations: Exeter Sustainable Finance Conference 2026 (scheduled), ARCS Annual Research Conference 2026 (scheduled), QRFE Climate Change Workshop 2026 (scheduled), CREDIT Venice 2025, Future Scholars in Finance Forum 2025, Liechtenstein Workshop of Sustainable Finance, 3rd London Political Finance Workshop, Sixth Edinburgh Corporate Finance Conference, Hong Kong-Shenzhen Joint Finance Research Workshop 2025, HKU Governance and Sustainability PhD Workshop 2025, FMA European Doctoral Student Consortium 2025, Junior Academics Research Seminars in Finance 2024-25, Xiamen University, Nanyang Technological University, City University of Hong Kong, Lingnan University, Peking University, and the University of Oxford

Do public policies necessarily foster private-sector prosocial behaviour? Using the adoption of greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets across nine U.S. states as an empirical setting, I find that firms in adopting states exhibit weaker voluntary motives to reduce emissions, as reflected in fewer emissions-related shareholder proposals and lower voting support. Despite policy incentives, these firms do not achieve greater emissions reductions relative to their peers. The policy is least effective for firms with stronger pre-policy voluntary motives, consistent with a crowding-out mechanism. Overall, the findings suggest that when public policy crowds out private-sector voluntary motives, it may undermine policy effectiveness.

Powerful CEOs in Uncertain Times: Survival of the Fittest          Paper  Slides 

Presentations: AEA  2024, AFA Poster 2023, University of Oxford (Best PhD Paper Award)

Contrary to the conventional focus on the costs of excessive CEO power, this study investigates whether powerful CEOs are beneficial and desirable under uncertainty. The evidence shows that powerful CEOs have a lower dismissal rate in uncertain times. As they exhibit better performance but no increased compensation, powerful CEOs are likely retained optimally for their effectiveness rather than by entrenched power. To mitigate endogeneity concerns surrounding CEO power, this paper utilizes the onset of COVID-19 pandemic as an unanticipated sudden spike in uncertainty, during which CEO power is unlikely to adjust swiftly to external conditions due to stickiness. The study proposes two potential mechanisms explaining why powerful CEOs are more effective under uncertainty: their willingness to share information with the board and their capability to take swift action. Overall, this study challenges the view that CEO power is always manipulative and detrimental.

Publications

Equity-Based Compensation and the Timing of Share Repurchases: The Role of the Corporate Calendar, with Ingolf Dittmann, Amy Yazhu Li, and Stefan Obernberger          Journal of Accounting and Economics (2025): 101798.          Paper  Slides

Featured in: Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance

Presentations: AFA 2023, E(uropean)FA 2023, NFA 2023, ECGC 2023, SFS Cavalcade Asia-Pacific 2022, AAA 2022, DGF 2022, Erasmus University Rotterdam, University of Amsterdam, and University of Oxford